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Abstract For all their various disagreements, one point upon which rights theorists
often agree is that it is simply part of the nature of rights that they tend to override,
outweigh or exclude competing considerations in moral reasoning, that they have
‘peremptory force’ (Raz in The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1986, p. 192), making ‘powerful demands’ that can only be overridden in
‘exceptional circumstances’ (Miller, in Cruft, Liao, Renzo (eds), Philosophical
Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 240). In
this article I challenge this thought. My aim here is not to prove that the traditional
view of rights’ stringency is necessarily false, nor even that we have no good reason
to believe it is true. Rather, my aim is only to show that we have good reason to
think that the foundation of the traditional position is less stable than we might have
otherwise supposed and that an alternative conception of rights—one which takes
the stringency of any given right as particular to the kind of right it is—is both
viable and attractive. In short, to begin to move us towards a more ‘particularist’
conception of rights’ standing in moral reasoning and judgement.
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Introduction
How stringent are rights? That is, at what point do they yield to competing
considerations in moral reasoning and judgement (Edmundson 2004, p. 129)?
Whatever writers’ various responses to this question, one point upon which almost
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all agree is that rights do not yield to much and there are at least some
considerations to which they never yield. And this is for a simple reason: namely, it
is just part of the nature of rights, qua rights, that they override, outweigh or exclude
competing considerations in moral reasoning, that they have ‘peremptory force’
(Raz 1986, p. 192), making ‘powerful demands’ that can only be overridden in
‘exceptional circumstances’ (Miller 2016, p. 240).
In this article, I put forward an alternative account of rights’ standing, one which
I call a ‘particularist’ account. According to this view, the decisiveness of any given
right over any given set of competing considerations is not taken as something that
follows from its status as a right—which is to say, a moral consideration of a certain
kind—but rather is something particular to the kind of right it is, with one possibility
being that it fails to present decisive reasons for action with respect to any
competing consideration whatsoever.1
I motivate this position in three ways. First, I claim that there are significant
problems in several of the main arguments by which writers have sought to defend
the traditional view of rights’ stringency. Second—and relatedly—I suggest that an
alternative conception of rights’ stringency is at least viable, or logically possible.
Third, I argue that there are important advantages to recognising the possibility of at
least some rights which routinely yield to alternative considerations in moral
reasoning and judgement—and thus moving towards a more particularist view.
In presenting these arguments, my aim is not to show that the traditional view of
rights’ stringency is necessarily false. Nor, indeed, is my aim to show that we have
no good reason to believe the traditional view of rights’ stringency is true. (To prove
that, one would have to show that every justification that has ever been offered of
the traditional view is false, something which it is certainly beyond the scope of the
present article.) Instead, my aim is only to show that the foundation of the
traditional position is perhaps less stable than we might have otherwise supposed,
and that an alternative conception is both viable and attractive. In short, to move us
‘towards’ a particularist conception of rights’ stringency, rather than present a
definitive argument as to why our present position is unviable. Before getting into
the main course of the discussion, however, let me say a bit more about the
traditional view and the main claims about rights’ stringency I want to contest.
1 There are those who have endorsed similar positions. Brandt, for example, sets out a conception of
rights which takes all rights as ‘only prima facie, not only in the sense that they may be overridden by
other rights in certain circumstances, but also that they may be overridden by other moral considerations
that are not matters of rights at all’ (Brandt 1992, p. 190). Where I disagree with Brandt, however, is on
the metaethical justification for such a position (my argument following from a common conception of
what rights are and the work they do in moral reasoning, Brandt’s position being at least partly a product
of his wider rule-utilitarianism). A much closer position to mine, albeit one that still diverges at certain
points and one which is again motivated on quite different grounds, is Danny Frederick’s conception of
‘pro-tanto’ rights (Frederick 2014).
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Stringency
As set out above, the primary purpose of this paper is to challenge the notion that
rights, qua rights, tend to override, outweigh or exclude other competing
considerations in moral reasoning and judgement. This view makes two connected
claims about rights’ standing: first, that there is something we can know about the
stringency of any given right simply by virtue of knowing it is a right; second, that
the thing one can know about the stringency of a right, simply by virtue of knowing
it is a right, is that it is stringent to at least some extent. In what follows, I refer to
the former as the generalist’s ‘abstract claim’ about rights’ stringency and the latter
as the generalist’s ‘concrete claim’ (the labelling of such claims as ‘generalist’
being an indication that they are meant to hold as a general principle, which is to
say, across all cases in which rights feature). I shall say a little bit more about these
claims in a moment. However, first let me say something about what I mean by the
claim that rights may be more or less ‘stringent’.
As I understand it here, to make a claim about the stringency of a given right is to
make a claim about the range of moral considerations that right overrides, or
outweighs, or excludes in moral reasoning and judgement; or, in my preferred way
of putting things, the reasons in respect to which a right offers a decisive or
conclusive reason for action.2 By a ‘conclusive reason’ here, I mean a reason for
action which is able, by itself, to establish what we ought to do overall, or all things
considered. In this, conclusive reasons may be properly contrasted with contributory
reasons. A contributory reason, by contrast, is a reason that establishes what we
ought to do absent any other reason, or all other things being equal, but which does
not necessarily tell us what we ought to do overall, or all things considered (Dancy
2004, p. 16).
One important assumption of this article is that rights comprise one species of
moral consideration, with other species including ‘social’ or ‘collective’ goals (such
as the maximisation of happiness across a community) and ‘imperfect’ or ‘unipolar’
duties (such as duties of beneficence, or duties of honesty). Moreover, as I
understand it, as one species of moral consideration, rights—like social goals, and
imperfect duties—necessarily present us with contributory reasons for action.
Which is to say, they present us with a case for acting in a certain way, all other
things being equal. Insofar as we take rights as the source of certain ‘directed’ or
‘bipolar’ duties (cf. Tasioulas 2010, p. 656), or as endowing the right-holder with
justifiable claims on others’ actions (Hart 1955), one natural way to understand the
content of these reasons would be in terms of those duties generated by P’s right,
each of which may be taken to describe how we ought to act with regards to the
right-holder. (Note: by duties here, and in what follows, I mean a pro tanto moral
requirement, which is to say, something which, all other things being equal, we
morally ought to do or—as I take to be equivalent—it would be morally wrong not
to do. In this, my use of the term duty differs from that of a number of other writers,
who tend to use the term duty to denote a more binding set of obligations. Perhaps
the most notable among these, in light of our present discussion, is Joseph Raz, for
2 In this, I broadly follow Sreenivasan (2010), although there are differences to our accounts.
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whom the word duty implies something it would always be wrong not to do, duties
having ‘pre-emptive force’, ‘replacing’, rather than ‘competing with’, other reasons
which apply in the circumstances (Raz 1986, p. 186)).
Assuming, then, that rights necessarily present us with contributory reasons for
action, there is now a further question about whether, on occasion, rights might also
present us with decisive reasons to act, or reasons that establish what we ought to
do, all things considered. And it is with respect to this question that we are led to a
discussion of rights’ ‘stringency’.
One view we might take here is that rights always present us with decisive
reasons for action, regardless of whatever countervailing reasons are at play. To
hold this position would be to endorse what is often referred to as an ‘absolutist’
conception of rights: namely, one which holds that there are no possible moral
considerations in virtue of which a right may be overridden or justifiably infringed
(any failure to fulfil a right effectively amounting to a violation, or unjustified
infringement—cf. Gewirth 1986; McConnell 2000, p. 5).3 More temperately,
however, we might think that the decisiveness of a right depends upon what kind of
other moral considerations are arrayed against it, their number and make-up. For
example, we might think that the fact that u-ing infringes P’s right might constitute
a decisive reason not to u when judged in light of the reasons for action presented
by moral considerations x, y and z, but it might not if one were to judge it in light of
the reasons for action presented by moral considerations a, b and c. On this model,
then, the stringency of a right might be seen to articulate a point along a range of
possibilities, with rights being ‘more’ or ‘less’ stringent depending on which
alternative moral considerations they are being held in judgement against, their
number and arrangement.4 Thus, a maximally stringent right is one which is
decisive regardless of whatever alternative moral considerations, or combinations of
considerations are arrayed against it (being effectively ‘absolute’). A minimally
stringent right is one which presents a conclusive reason for action in respect to only
one other moral consideration. Finally, insofar as a right is not stringent at all, it
only ever presents a contributory reason for action.
If this helps us understand what is meant when we talk about a right being more
or less stringent, what sense can we make of the generalist’s abstract and concrete
3 One writer to whom something like this position is often ascribed is Robert Nozick. In his Anarchy,
state, utopia, for example, Nozick claims ‘the side-constraint view (i.e. his view of rights) forbids you to
violate these moral constraints in the pursuit of your goals’ and ‘individuals are inviolable’, both of which
appear absolutist in tone (Nozick 1974, p. 31). However, elsewhere Nozick appears to have recognised
that there may be some moral considerations that would justify infringing an individual’s right—most
notably in order to avoid ‘catastrophic moral horror’. Another writer who comes very close to an
absolutist view is Hillel Steiner, who holds a strong version of what he calls the ‘Moral Primacy’ thesis
about rights. Steiner attempts to avoid what might otherwise seem decisive counter-examples to this view
through a version of specificationism, effectively arguing that in cases where it appears that a right maybe
overridden or justifiably infringed, it is because we have often underspecified the putatively overridden
rights (see e.g. Steiner 2013).
4 To this we might add Thomson’s insight that ‘It does not even seem to be obvious that there is any such
thing as the degree of stringency of any given right. Perhaps a right may be more or less stringent, as the
rightholder’s circumstances vary, and also, in the case of special rights, as the means by which he
acquired the right vary.’ (Thomson 1981, p. 136). However, for the sake of convenience, I leave these
complications to one side for the time being.
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claims? Let us start with the abstract claim. One way we might understand the
generalist’s abstract claim is as a claim about the relationship between the
stringency of any given right and its status as a right, which is to say, a moral
consideration of a particular sort. Specifically, what the generalist wants to say is
both that there is a general rule about the stringency of rights that holds across all
rights and that this follows, in some sense or other, from the fact that it is a right. To
hold the generalist’s abstract claim, then, is not necessarily to hold any particular
position about how stringent rights actually are. Rather, it is only to assert that we
can know something about the stringency of a right simply by knowing that it is a
right.
In this way, generalists who only endorse the generalist’s abstract claim may be
seen to stand above debates about the extent of rights’ stringency. However, the
kind of generalists I take myself to be addressing in this article also typically
endorse another claim about rights’ stringency, one which does make a substantive
claim about the extent of rights’ stringency. This is what I call the generalists’s
concrete claim. According to this claim, then, it is not only that we can know
‘something’ about the stringency of a right simply by virtue of knowing it is a right,
rather, we can also know that it is stringent to at least some degree, which is to say,
that it presents decisive reasons for action against at least some set of alternative
moral considerations.5
Decisiveness
In a moment, I want to explore some of the ways in which generalists might defend
the abstract and concrete claims. However, before doing so, there is one issue worth
putting to rest: namely, how the present discussion about rights’ stringency, qua
rights relates to a parallel debate about the way in which rights present decisive
reasons for action, when they do.
Two models dominate the latter exchange: the ‘force’ model and the
‘exclusionary’ model. On a ‘force’ model, the interplay of rights with other moral
reasons in matters of moral calculus is best understood as a kind of balancing act,
wherein the reasons for action presented by rights, along with those presented with
other moral reasons, have a certain ‘normative force’ or ‘weight’ which, when
weighed together, tells us where our overall duty lies (cf. Lyons 1984, p. 113). In
saying, then, that rights have a certain degree of stringency, that they present
‘decisive reasons for action’ when arrayed against some other set of moral
considerations X, what we mean is that rights, qua rights, always necessarily
5 In fact, many of the writers I would call ‘generalists’ tend to think rights are actually far more stringent
than the concrete claim suggests. Thus, on their account, it is not just that rights, qua rights, necessarily
present decisive reasons for action against at least some set of alternative moral considerations, they
present decisive reasons for action against a whole host of alternative moral considerations. However,
since I take it that all the challenges I make to the generalist position in what follows hold even with
respect to a minimalist species of that view, and since any critique of the minimalist position necessarily
implicates the maximalist position (a maximalist about rights necessarily being committed to the
minimalist position), we can feel confident about meeting the generalist on the most parsimonious
description of her position.
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‘outweigh’ X (considered individually or collectively). In other words, were they to
be deployed against such considerations (and only those considerations), rights
would necessarily tip the balance of reasons in favour of the action they (the rights)
demand—something they may or may not do with respect to other kinds of
considerations, or when those considerations are joined by others. By contrast, on an
‘exclusionary’ conception, insofar as rights present decisive reasons for action
against some other set of moral considerations, it is not by virtue of the fact that
rights possess any greater force or weight than other reasons, rather it is that they
exclude certain other kinds of reasons from playing any part in an overall judgement
about what to do. As Raz—the originator of this theory—explains, we might easily
get a grip on the notion of an ‘exclusionary reason’ by considering the case of a
spouse who has promised their partner to decide how to spend the weekend in light
of their own desires, irrespective of what they think their partner might want. In this
case, ‘Their promises are exclusionary reasons, reasons to exclude a consideration
from being the ground for any decision they may make’ (Raz 1988, p. 1158).
Similarly, insofar as rights are decisive against another moral consideration, it is not
that they offer reasons ‘one up’ on such considerations, or reasons of greater force,
rather it is that they render such considerations ‘off the table’.6
How, then, does this debate bear on the present debate about the merits (or
otherwise) of the generalist’s abstract and concrete claims? In one way, it has very
little bearing. As described above, what interests the generalist, with regard to the
abstract and concrete claim, is not the mechanisms by which a right presents
decisive reasons for action in moral reasoning and judgement—that is, whether it is
by virtue of the fact that rights’ possess greater normative ‘force’ or ‘weight’, or
insofar as they exclude certain other reasons—but the relationship between rights’
decisiveness (however conceived) and their status as a right. In this way, then,
generalists of the kind I intend to challenge here may stand above debates about
how we ought to understand any decisiveness rights have, being amenable to both.
This being said, however, it is worth noting that depending on which of the two
models one endorses, what it means to question the generalist’s position will
likewise differ. On the ‘force’ conception, then, what is being questioned here is the
extent to which rights, qua rights, necessarily present reasons that outweigh at least
some other reasons, as opposed to (sometimes) reasons that may be outweighed by
others. On the ‘exclusionary’ conception, by contrast, what is being questioned is
the extent to which rights, qua rights, necessarily present reasons not to act for
certain reasons (i.e. exclusionary reasons), as opposed to (sometimes) simply
reasons to act in a certain way (i.e. contributory reasons).
Ontological Defences
Why endorse the generalist’s abstract or concrete claim about rights’ stringency?
Since the generalist’s concrete claim is the more familiar of the two, let us start
there. As set out above, the generalist’s concrete claim is the claim that, simply by
6 For commentary see e.g. Edmundson (1993), Gans (1986), Moore (1988) and Perry (1988).
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virtue of knowing something is a right, we can know that it is stringent to at least
some degree, which is to say, that it presents decisive reasons for action against at
least some other moral considerations. Of course, what this leaves open is the
question of how we can know, simply by virtue of something being a right, that it is
stringent to at least some degree. One response might be to claim that it follows
from the nature and logical properties of rights, which is to say, that it describes a
feature rights must be held to possess if they are to be understandable as rights.
Another response might be to claim that it describes a feature rights must be held to
possess if they are to be concepts worth recognising within our moral lexicon. Then
again, another response might be to claim that it describes a feature rights happen to
possess by virtue of their relationship to some overriding moral concern.
In the hands of the generalist, each of these explanans become, in effect,
justifications of the concrete claim. In what follows, then, I refer to the first of these
as the generalist’s ‘ontological defence’ of the concrete claim, the second as the
generalist’s ‘superficial defence’, and the third as the generalist’s ‘derivative
defence’. In the rest of this section I consider various species of the ontological
defence, before moving to the superficial defence and derivative defence in sections
‘Superficial Defences’ and ‘Derivative Defences’ respectively.
One way, then, in which one might motivate the generalist’s concrete claim is by
arguing that it follows from the nature and logical properties of rights. There are a
few ways this thought might go. First, one might argue that the claim that rights
have a certain level of stringency necessarily follows from those characteristics that
make a right a ‘right’ in the first place, which is to say, that it is logically entailed by
the properties that make rights ‘rights’. Second, one might claim that such standing
is not a property of rights logically entailed by those properties that make rights
‘rights’, rather it is one of the properties that make rights ‘rights’. Finally, one might
argue that it is not one of the properties that make rights ‘rights’, rather it is the only
property that makes rights ‘rights’; in other words, rights are nothing other than that
set of moral considerations that present a decisive reason for action against other
moral considerations. For ease of reference, I shall call the first of these the ‘weak’
ontological defence of the concrete claim, the second the ‘medium-strength’
ontological defence and the last the ‘strong’ ontological defence.
One thing these arguments bring to the fore, of course, is that, in some respects,
our present discussion is as much a discussion about what constitutes the essential
features of rights, qua rights, as it is about rights’ standing in matters of moral
judgement and reasoning. This, in turn, raises questions about what constitutes
proper grounds for asserting the merits of one conception of rights over any other.
For example, as the arguments set out above intimate, one way proponents of the
concrete claim might justify their position is by first asserting a conception of rights
that renders the truth of the concrete claim effectively analytic. Thus, in line with
the strong ontological defence, such an interlocutor might argue: ‘Rights are nothing
other than moral considerations that present a decisive reason for action against
other moral considerations. Therefore, simply by virtue of knowing something is a
right, we can also know that it is stringent to at least some degree, which is to say,
that it presents decisive reasons for action against at least some set of alternative
moral considerations’.
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If we are to challenge these arguments, then, we first need an independent set of
criteria for evaluating what constitutes a satisfactory conception of rights. There
look to be at least three desirderata. First, if a conception of rights is to meet a
minimum standard of adequacy it needs to be logically coherent, which is to say, it
cannot assert anything inconsistent or contradictory. Second, such a conception
needs to demarcate rights as a distinctive concept in moral reasoning and
judgement.7 Finally, conceptions of rights need to be able to make sense of the way
we currently conceive of rights in moral, political and legal theory (cf. Raz 1986,
pp. 165–166). A brief note on this last point: to say that such conceptions need to
‘make sense’ of the way we currently conceive of rights is not necessarily to claim
that they need to mirror our preconceptions perfectly. After all, one of the purposes
of this article is to suggest that at least some of our preconceptions about rights—or
at least, about the way that rights function in moral reasoning and discourse—are
mistaken. At the same time, however, we might agree that insofar as a given
definition renders rights unrecognisable—which is to say, that it would fail to pick
out the kind of concept we are referring to when we refer to P as having a right to
u—we might similarly think that whatever definition it is offering, it is not that of a
right.
These desiderata accepted, it seems clear that the strong ontological defence does
not offer a sufficient justification of the concrete claim. First, the conception of
rights it relies upon—that rights are nothing other than moral considerations that
present a decisive reason for action against other moral considerations—is too
broad; it fails to meet the second desiderata. Assuming we think there are at least
some moral considerations other than rights, rights cannot simply be moral
considerations that present decisive reasons for action against other moral
considerations, for this would imply that all moral considerations that present
decisive reasons for action are necessarily rights, something which is clearly false.
(Consider, for example, cases where no rights are present.) Second, relating to the
third desiderata, the definition is also too circumspect; that is, it fails to pick out
many of the characteristics that we tend to associate with rights, and to which we
often appeal when attempting to differentiate them from other kinds of moral
consideration.
A number of such features are widely accepted. (1) That rights denote a status of
individuals or moral agents (a set which may be taken to include individuals other
than human beings, corporations and/or groups—cf. Dworkin 2005, p. 91). (2) That
rights seek to secure something that is good or valuable for that individual,
something that it would be better, all things being equal, that they should have than
not. In Raz’s view of rights, this is expressed in the thought that rights are grounded
in individuals’ interests—see Raz (1986).8 (3) That rights engender ‘directed,’ or
7 One thing that this desiderata assumes, of course, is that there are moral considerations other than
rights. Some may question this. However, I take it that the standard view here is that there are moral
considerations other than rights—most notably, ‘collective’ or ‘social’ goals and ‘imperfect’ or ‘non-
directed’ or ‘unipolar’ duties—and that our definition of rights needs to explain how the role rights play in
morality differs from that played by these kinds of concepts.
8 Kamm offers a forceful challenge to this kind of condition. As she explains, some rights may be
justified by the object’s moral nature directly, rather than by the object’s interests:
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‘relational,’ or ‘bipolar’ duties, which is to say, duties owed to the right-holder.
(Hence, when we fail to abide by the reasons for action presented by an agent’s
rights, we do not merely do wrong, rather we wrong that agent—cf. May 2015.) (4)
That to fulfil an individual’s right is only to meet a minimal or required standard of
moral behaviour, as opposed to doing anything supererogatory.9 All these features,
then, are routinely recognised as features that help differentiate rights from other
kinds of consideration (some necessary, others sufficient), yet they are all absent
from the definition of rights as considerations that present decisive reasons for
action.
Indeed, it is perhaps worth noting that this appears to be accepted even by those
writers who might (wrongly) be read as claiming that rights are nothing other than
moral considerations that present decisive reasons for action. For example, at times,
Raz might be seen to endorse a conception of rights that holds them to be nothing
other than decisive reason for action. As he puts it at one point ‘by definition rights
are nothing but grounds of duties’ (Raz 1986, p. 176). (As above, note that by duties
here, Raz means moral considerations that have ‘pre-emptive force’, which is to say,
that ‘replace rather than compete with (some of) the other reasons which apply in
the circumstances’—Raz 1986, p. 186.) However, it seems clear enough that Raz
does not seek to define rights solely in respect of their moral standing. Rather, as he
explains, his analysis of rights explains their ‘uniqueness’ as a ‘combination of two
element’: (i) ‘rights have a special force which is expressed by the fact that they are
grounds of duties, which are peremptory reasons for action’; (ii) ‘rights express
what is owed to the right-holder in virtue of the respect due to his interest’ (Raz
1986, p. 249). Here (ii) appears to pick up (3) above.10
Footnote 8 continued
Persons might have a right to treatment as equals… without our duty to them being based on their
interests. Rather, I would say, this right is based on their nature as persons and not necessarily
related to any aspect of their well-being. Even if it turns out to be in their interest to have this
nature, the right derives from their nature and not from their interest in having it.… If there were
an independent ‘dignitary interest’ in being treated as an equal … it need not be because this
treatment serves that interest that a person has a right to it. It may simply be fitting to treat a person
no differently from anyone else. (Kamm 2007, p. 246)
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to enter into an extensive discussion on this point (see e.g.
May 2015, for more on this). However, I take it that, even if, from Kamm’s perspective, (2)’s formulation
as it is set out above might appear a little clunky, (i.e. insofar as it fails to respect the fact that a right
maybe grounded simply in, say, a human being’s nature as a rational agent who can value and pursue ends
of her own, rather than in something good for that agent), there are ways of formulating (2) that would be
able to acknowledge the possibility of the kind of rights to which she refers.
9 Feinburg might be seen to be gesturing to something like this idea when he argues that, when rights are
fulfilled, ‘there is no place for gratitude, an expression of which would suggest that it is not simply one’s
own or one’s due that one was given. Both kinds of transaction are important, and any world with one but
not the other would—in Wasserstrom’s phrase—be ‘‘morally impoverished.’’’ (Feinberg 1966, p. 142).
10 A similar point may be made with respect to Dworkin. At one point, for example, Dworkin appears to
define rights merely by the extent to which they present decisive reasons for action against collective
goals, writing that individuals have rights only when, ‘for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient
justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient
justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them’ (Dworkin 2005, p. xi). However, elsewhere
Dworkin recognises that rights possess characteristics outside their ‘force’ against ‘competing claims’
Towards a More Particularist View of Rights’ Stringency
123
Insofar then, as we recognise that rights have features apart from their
decisiveness in moral reasoning and judgement, it appears difficult to motivate
the concrete claim by way of the strong ontological defence. What, though, of the
medium-strength ontological defence? Might we not argue that rights’ imagined
stringency with respect to other moral considerations is not the only property that
makes rights ‘rights’ but that it is at least one of the properties that makes them
‘rights’? To make this claim, of course, one thing that we would need to show is that
it is impossible to conceive of rights as rights without ascribing to them a certain
stringency in respect to alternative moral considerations. In other words, that
properties (1)–(4), say, are not, on their own, sufficient to meet our three desiderata.
However, it is difficult to see how such an argument might go. That is, to my mind
at least, the kind of properties gestured to in (1)–(4) look amply sufficient to meet
our three desiderata of a satisfactory conception of rights without further appeal to
any claim about rights standing in moral reasoning and judgement. In particular, in
(3)—the claim that rights are moral statuses that engender directed or relational
duties—we appear to have a perfectly understandable conception of what rights are,
one which is logically coherent (desiderata one), that demarcates rights as a
distinctive concept in moral reasoning and judgement (desiderata two) and that
makes sense of the way we currently conceive of rights in moral, political and legal
theory (desiderata three). To put this in Raz’s terms above: it seems perfectly
possible to hold a conception of rights according to which ‘rights express what is
owed to the right-holder in virtue of the respect due to his interest’ (ii), without
needing to appeal to the further claim that ‘rights have a special force which is
expressed by the fact that they are grounds of … peremptory reasons for action’
(i) (Raz 1986, p. 249).
Let us assume, then, that there is some set of properties we can ascribe to rights
that provide us with a coherent conception of what rights are without necessarily
including within that set the property that rights have a certain standing in moral
reasoning and judgement. Still, might we not argue that such a standing is logically
entailed by those properties that we do take to identify rights as rights (i.e. the weak
ontological defence)? Again, if the properties in question here are those gestured to
in (1)–(4) it seems difficult to see why this would be the case. For example, with
respect to (3) it seems perfectly possible to assert that rights are the source of
directed or relational duties without also saying anything about their stringency.
This point is well made by Sreenivasan in respect to what he refers to as a
Footnote 10 continued
(Dworkin 2005, p. 91). For example, on Dworkin’s account, a right is ‘an individuated political aim’
(apparently picking up (1) and (2) above). As he explains:
An individual has a right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts in favour of a
political decision that the decision is likely to advance or protect the state of affairs in which he
enjoys the right, even where no other political aim is served and some political aim is disserved
thereby, and counts against that decision that it will retard or endanger that state of affairs, even
when some other political aim is thereby served. (Dworkin 2005, p. 91)
In this, Dworkin takes rights to contrast with collective goals, where ‘a goal is a non-individuated political
aim, that is, a state of affairs whose specification does not in this way call for any particular opportunity or
resource or liberty for particular individuals’ (Dworkin 2005, p. 91).
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Hohfeldian conception of moral claim-rights. As he explains, such a conception of
rights is ‘clearly and importantly distinct’ from the notion of, say, rights as moral
considerations that present decisive reasons for action, or what he terms ‘a
deonological moral claim right’; and while nothing prevents Hohfeldian moral
claim-rights from playing the role of its deonological counterpart, neither are they
logically dependent (Sreenivasan 2010).
For these reasons, then, I take it that the generalist cannot defend the concrete
claim via either the weak, medium-strength or strong onological defences. This is
important to the current argument insofar as it undercuts one of the main set of
arguments that could be used to defend the generalist’s position. However, it is also
important in another way: namely, insofar as it helps us to see that an alternative
conception of rights—that is one which accepts that they do not (always) present
decisive reasons for action, or, as is the same, that they may, on occasion, only
present contributory reasons for action—is at least viable.
What might this alternative conception of rights look like? And what kind of
rights might it include? I will primarily deal with these questions in section
‘Rejecting Generalism’ However, to give an indication of what kind of conception
we are working towards, it helps, perhaps, to consider the possibility of a right that
fails to present decisive reasons for action against any competing considerations
whatsoever. Consider the following case. In the British Library in London there is
an informal arrangement whereby if one is the first to arrive at a desk in the
morning, one may ‘reserve’ that desk by placing one’s books upon it. Books placed
on the table, then, indicate that that desk is being used, even if no one is presently
sitting there, and it also indicates that others ought not to use it. To my mind, this
situation is best understood in terms of something like a property right. When I
place my books on the table, I equally place you under an obligation not to move
them, or otherwise use the desk. However, if this is a property right, then it also
appears to be one that yields to almost any other moral consideration whatsoever.
That is, it seems difficult to imagine any other consideration which could not
constitute a good reason to move someone’s books.
Now, in suggesting this as one example of a right that is not stringent at all, one
opens oneself up to numerous counters based on the case at hand. Does one’s
temporary property rights over a desk space really constitute a moral right? And
even if it does, are we sure there are no other moral considerations in respect to
which it might not present a decisive reason for action? More pressing than these
counters, perhaps, is a worry about whether it is really worth our time and energy to
consider the moral status of these kinds of rights in the first place. ‘Is that what is at
stake in all of this?’ one might ask: ‘We are discussing whether we ought to
recognise temporary property rights to desk space as rights?’ However, this counter
may be rebuffed in fairly short order. For, of course, what we are interested in here
is not just the possibility of these kinds of rights but what we may legitimately say
about rights, how we ought to understand them as moral objects and how we ought
to understand the role that they play in moral reasoning and judgement. A right over
a desk space, then, presents us with an example of (at best) a minimally stringent
right but more important than that, it suggests that the possibility that there may be
some rights we can coherently classify as rights, even though they do not (appear) to
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present decisive reasons for action (or at least, even if they do, that is not what
makes them rights).
We have, though, moved slightly away from our discussion of the generalist’s
position. Next, then, let us look at superficial defences.
Superficial Defences
As set out above, along with the ontological defence, one way in which the
generalist might seek to defend the concrete claim is by making what I have called
the superficial defence. Unlike the ontological defence, to make this defence, the
generalist need not insist on the idea that the concrete claim follows from the nature
of rights as a moral concept in anything like a strict logical entailment. Instead, the
generalist may claim that, although it may be possible for a right to be
understandable as a right while failing to possess the standing demarcated by the
concrete claim, for various reasons, the only rights worth recognising as rights are
those that do possess such a standing.
One writer who might be read as making something like this argument is Ronald
Dworkin in his ‘Rights as Trumps’ (Dworkin 1984). Now, it is not always entirely
clear that Dworkin actually does intend to defend the concrete claim by way of the
superficial defence as opposed to, say, the ontological defence. However, I think his
arguments can certainly be read in this light, and, given their enormous influence in
rights theory, they are certainly worth discussing here.
In ‘Rights as Trumps’, Dworkin argues that whatever our various disagreements
about what rights are, we are justified in defining as rights only those rights that
offer decisive reasons against collective goals (or, as he puts it, that ‘trump’ such
considerations) because we have no need of rights except when we need to explain
what would be wrong about endorsing a kind of ‘unrestricted’ utilitarianism. As he
explains:
We need rights, as a distinct element in political theory, only when some
decision that injures some people nevertheless finds prima-facie support in the
claim that it will make the community as a whole better off on some plausible
account of where the community’s general welfare lies. But the most natural
source of any objection we might have to such a decision is that, in its concern
with the welfare or prosperity or flourishing of people on the whole, or in the
fulfilment of some interest, widespread within the community, the decision
pays insufficient attention to its impact on the minority; and some appeal to
equality seems a natural expression of an objection from that source. (Dworkin
1984, p. 166)
In this passage, then, Dworkin establishes a strong justification for why we might
think we need rights as a concept in moral—as well as political—theory: namely
that it enables us to account for wrong involved in decisions which ‘injure some
people’ while simultaneously making the community as a whole better off.
However, we need to be very careful here about precisely what Dworkin’s argument
justifies. That is, while we might think that Dworkin’s argument gives us good
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reason to think we need some concept of rights in moral theory, it is not clear why
we need a concept of rights as decisive reasons against collective goals. Why not
think that rights merely show that there would be something wrong in ‘injuring
some people’ in order that we might benefit the community; that is, that such
injuries present contributory, rather than conclusive, reasons against some action?
One thing that Dworkin might say in response here, and indeed, something that
he does say at certain points in his discussion, is that in certain situations we do not
want to say that there is merely something wrong about such actions but rather that
they are overall wrong, or all things considered wrong. As he puts it (seemingly
appealing to the idea of something being overall wrong):
We want to say that the decision is wrong, in spite of its apparent merit,
because it does not take the damage it causes to some into account in the right
way and therefore does not treat these people as equals entitled to the same
concern as others. (Dworkin 1984, p. 116)
Earlier in the essay he raises a good case in point here: namely, individuals’ rights
to political independence. As Dworkin explains, one problem with endorsing
utilitarianism as a general background justification for political decisions is that we
(can) seem wedded to the thought that we must take into account each and
everyone’s political (and/or moral) preferences, as well as their personal prefer-
ences, in our overall calculation as to the utility of a given state of affairs. We seem
to need to count, for example, the Nazi’s preference that Jews are given less of a
particular resource, or the homophobe’s preference to ban homosexuality. If we are
to make utilitarianism an ‘attractive working political theory’, then, we need to
‘qualify’ it so as ‘to restrict the preferences that count by excluding [certain]
political preferences’ (Dworkin 1984, p. 158). A right to political independence—
that is, ‘the right that no one suffer disadvantage in the distribution of goods or
opportunities on the ground that others think he should have less because of who he
is or is not’—understood as a ‘trump’ over utilitarian concerns achieves this
restriction by rendering inclusion of, and acting upon, such preferences as always,
all things considered wrong (Dworkin 1984, p. 158). In so doing, then, Jews are
‘insulated’ from the preferences of the Nazis (Dworkin 1984, p. 158).11
Again, much of this seems right. Certainly we might agree that, in this case,
Jews’ rights to political independence do ‘trump’, or offer decisive reason against,
mere utilitarian concerns, and that we need a moral concept capable of performing
this role. However, again, the mere fact we need to be able to assert that some rights
present decisive reasons for action does not, in itself, suggest that we only need
rights when they perform such a function. That is, why not think that rights continue
to serve a useful function—that they are worth recognising as rights—when they fail
to override the demands of some social goal; in short, when they only present a
contributory reason for action?
11 At this point, Dworkin might be seen to be prevaricating between a conception of rights as forming a
protective barrier around certain individual interests, and a conception of rights as refining utilitarian
justifications by excluding certain types of preferences. For a discussion of how Dworkin employs these
two types of conceptions and various problems involved his (apparent) endorsement of both, see Yowell
(2007).
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Dworkin provides further arguments on this point in his earlier monograph,
Taking Rights Seriously. As he explains, one of the reasons we only need rights
when they have the kind of standing captured by the concrete claim is because there
is simply ‘no point’ to recognising any right when it fails to meet that threshold. As
he explains:
It follows from the definition of a right that it cannot be outweighed by all
social goals….Suppose, for example, some man says he recognizes the right of
free speech, but adds that free speech must yield whenever its exercise would
inconvenience the public. He means, I take it, that he recognises the pervasive
goal of collective welfare, and only such distribution of liberty of speech as
that collective goal recommends in particular circumstances. His political
position is exhausted by the collective goal; the putative right adds nothing
and there is no point to recognising it as a right at all. (Dworkin 2005, p. 92)
I do not find this line of argument particularly persuasive. In the passage,
Dworkin appears to want to argue that there is no need to recognise any right that
failed to offer decisive reasons against collective goals—what we might call non-
trumping or quasi-rights—because such rights ‘add nothing’ to moral reasoning. Yet
this looks plainly false. That is, we might think that such rights play two significant
roles within moral reasoning—and political theory for that matter—even where they
fail to provide sufficient justification for overriding the demands of alternative moral
considerations. First, simply by presenting a contributory reason for action, even if
some quasi-rights necessarily bow to the demands of all other moral considerations,
such rights would still be sufficient to determine what we ought to do, all things
considered, when asserted on their own, which is to say, in absence of any other
moral consideration. (All other things being equal, your right to the desk you have
reserved still places me under an obligation not to use it, even if it is a duty that I
might justifiably ignore in the face of any other moral considerations whatsoever.)
Second, by virtue of offering contributory reasons for action, even where, say,
P’s quasi-right does fail to overrule, say, the demands of collective goal x, such
rights still perform a vital role in our overall understanding of the moral facts insofar
as they establish that that course of action—which is to say, the pursuit of collective
goal x—while overall justified, is still one that comes at a moral cost: namely, its
failure to fulfil P’s right. Thus, even if they fail to establish on their own what we
should do all things considered, simply by favouring a certain course of action,
quasi-rights still play an important function: they explain how an entirely justifiable
moral decision may still be non-optimum, that it carries what Bernard Williams
calls a moral ‘residue’ (Williams 1973, p. 179).12
A good case in point here is Feinberg’s well-known wilderness example:
Suppose that you are on a backpacking trip in the high mountain country when
an unanticipated blizzard strikes the area with such ferocity that your life is
imperilled. Fortunately, you stumble onto an unoccupied cabin, locked and
boarded up for the winter, clearly somebody else’s private property. You
12 See also Thomson’s critique of specificationism in rights (Thomson 1990, pp. 82–104).
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smash in a window, enter, and huddle in a corner for three days until the storm
abates. During this period you help yourself to your unknown benefactor’s
food supply and burn his wooden furniture in the fireplace to keep warm.
Surely you are justified in doing all these things, and yet you have infringed
the clear rights of another person. (Feinberg 1980, p. 230)
Now the question of whether, as Feinberg claims, you would be justified in
infringing the rights of the cabin holder in this situation—and therefore, that rights
may be justifiably infringed—continues to be the subject of extensive debate (see
e.g. Steiner 2013, p. 236). However, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
backpacker’s actions were justified, does the fact that, nevertheless, the cabin owner
had a right to who used their cabin tell us anything about the moral situation? To my
mind, it seem clear that it does: namely, it tells us that there is at least one
consideration that tells against the backpacker’s actions; that, insofar as the
backpacker infringes the cabin owner’s rights, even if their actions were overall
justified, the cabin owner has at least some cause for complaint, perhaps even
grounds for compensation.13 In other words, then, the moral situation would be
quite different if the cabin was not owned by anyone.
Returning to Dworkin’s argument above, we can see that for similar reasons R’s
endorsement of the view that, for all its moral significance, P’s right fails to trump
collective goal x, does not imply that her political position is ‘exhausted’ by her
endorsement of collective goal x; for any statement restricted to the claim ‘R
endorses collective goal x’ while true, also fails to account for at least one facet of
her position: namely her view that there are rights here at stake (albeit rights that can
be justifiably infringed by collective goal x). There is still, then, a point to
stipulating a right falling short of the kind of trumping threshold Dworkin posits, for
recognition of such rights still helps us make sense of the moral features of the
situation: i.e. that there is at least one consideration that counts against the pursuit
collective goal x, and that consideration is the damage such a pursuit does to the
right-bearer with respect to their right.
It seems difficult, therefore, to defend the concrete claim on the basis that there is
no point to recognising those rights that fail to offer decisive reasons for action. At
this stage, however, the generalist might be moved to make another argument in
defence of the concrete claim, one which might also be bracketed under the banner
of a superficial defence. That is, rather than arguing that it is ‘not worth recognising’
non-trumping or quasi-rights because such rights have no part to play in moral
theory, the generalist might instead argue that it is ‘not worth recognising’ such
rights in the sense that, were we to do so, we would lose the special status we have
accorded them. Raz might be read as making this argument in defence of his own
conception of rights as the grounds of duties. As he explains:
The idea of a right to personal autonomy, for example, is attractive partly
because such a right establishes a limit to what can be demanded of an
13 One of Steiner’s misgivings about the kind of model being suggested here is that it leaves the question
of whether the cabin owner is owed compensation ‘open’ (Steiner 2013). However, it is open to defenders
of the model I am suggesting to claim that all infringements of a person’s rights provide legitimate
grounds for compensation, only that there may be some rights which are routinely justifiably overridden.
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individual in the name of collective goals and of communal welfare. But if
rights do not represent the special force of the interest of the right-holder then
they cease to capture the idea of a protective shield against the claim of the
well-being of others. (Raz 1986, pp. 249–250)
Again, I am not particularly persuaded by this line of argument (which it, ought to
be said, has been voiced by numerous writers other than Raz—see e.g. Habermas
1999, p. 260; Young 2014, p. 48). According to Raz, we can ascribe a certain utility
to reserving the name ‘right’ for only those rights that do present decisive reasons
for action, for, by doing so, we know that, whenever we assert P’s right to u, we
also know that we are talking about a moral object that presents a decisive reason
for action. By contrast, were we to admit of some rights that failed to meet this
criteria, it would be an open question as to whether P’s right to u constituted a
decisive reason for action or merely a contributory one. However, while it is easy to
see why it might be useful to restrict possible meanings of the term ‘right’ in this
way, it also comes at a huge cost. By restricting our use of the term ‘right’ to only
those rights that do present decisive reasons for action in moral reasoning and
judgement, one makes it impossible to refer to any right that fails to present such
reasons. Of course, insofar as Raz’s argument ultimately relies on an overall
judgement about the costs and benefits associated with different uses of specific
moral terminology, the extent to which we should leave the decisiveness of rights
‘open’ might be seen as something about which reasonable people might disagree.
However, to my mind at least, it seems difficult to justify effectively removing a
concept from our moral lexicon (i.e. that of a non-trumping or quasi-right) simply so
that we know that whenever someone uses the term ‘right’ they are referring to a
right that presents a decisive reason for action. If that is the price of such shorthand,
then it seems too high.
It seems false, then, to claim, along with Dworkin, that there is no benefit to
recognising as rights only those rights that are stringent to the extent demarcated by
the concrete claim, or with Raz, that the costs of recognising such rights are greater
than their benefits. Either way we read it, then, it looks like there are significant
problems with a superficial defence of the concrete claim.
Derivative Defences
Let us now turn to one last set of arguments that have been put forward in defence
of the concrete claim: namely, derivative defences. As with the superficial defence,
in making this argument, the generalist may accept that it is perfectly possible for
some rights to fall short of the kind of moral standing prescribed by the concrete
claim. Moreover, against the superficial defence, they may even accept that were
such rights to exist they would be ‘worth recognising’. However, at this point the
generalist may interject that the entire discussion of whether such ‘quasi-rights’ are
possible, or valuable assets within our moral theory, is moot, for the only rights that
exist are those that do possess such a standing. And this is because, so the argument
goes, all rights derive from a moral principle of primary moral importance. Thus,
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we can know by virtue of something being a right that it is stringent to at least some
extent (the concrete claim), by virtue of the fact that all rights derive from some
overriding moral concern (the derivative defence).
One writer who might be read to have been making something like this argument
is Robert Nozick. Famously, Nozick holds a view according to which rights act as
‘side-constraints’ upon our action: ‘don’t violate constraints C’ (Nozick 1974,
p. 29). Nozick defends this view, in part, by appealing to the Kantian principle that
individuals are ends and not merely means, something he interprets as the dictum
‘they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their
consent’ (Nozick 1974, p. 31). Later, he adds further content to this thought by
claiming that to use a person (say, for the benefit of others), is to fail to ‘sufficiently
respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person’ (Nozick 1974,
p. 33). Thus, in Nozick’s own summary of his position:
The moral side constraints upon what we may do, I claim, reflect the fact of
our separate existences. They reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can
take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by
others so as to lead to a greater overall social good. There is no justified
sacrifice of some of us for others. (Nozick 1974, p. 33)
One way, it seems, that we might characterise Nozick’s defence of the concrete
claim is as resting on a moral view which accords lexical priority to individuals’
self-ownership over all other moral concerns (cf. Cohen 1995, p. 67; Arneson 2011,
p. 23; although, for a note of caution about placing too much emphasis on this see
Mack 2015). First among moral principles is the principle that in any dealings, we
ought to respect individuals’ sovereignty over themselves as ‘distinct individuals
each with his own life to live’ (Nozick 1974, p. 34). Since, then, all moral rights
derive from this fundamental moral principle, and since this principle has lexical
priority over any other, all moral rights have lexical priority over any other moral
consideration; or, in other words, rights act as ‘moral side constraints upon what we
may do’.
There are, however, a number of problems with this position. First, it seems
difficult to motivate the notion that, among all the possible moral concerns we might
have, individuals’ sovereignty over themselves has lexical priority, such that, even
if we were to add all other moral concerns together, they would be insufficient to
override it. The preservation of life on earth, for example, might be seen as
something that might take precedence over the respect we ought to accord to an
individual’s sovereignty over themselves. Second, it is also not clear why
individuals’ rights, as opposed to any other moral concept, are particularly suited
to protecting individuals’ self-ownership.14 Why not think that individuals’
sovereignty over themselves as ‘distinct individuals each with his own life to live’
is better protected through a system of imperfect or unipolar duties? And if they can
be, why think that it is rights that act as side-constraints on what we may do, which
may never be justifiably infringed, rather than, say, some set of unipolar duties?
14 For an interesting discussion on this, see Mack (1981).
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if we accept that some principle of
individual self-ownership has priority over other moral concerns, and that rights are
particularly suited to protecting such self-ownership, it is not entirely clear why we
should think that there are no rights other than those that protect self-ownership.
One case in point here is individuals’ property rights (that is, their rights to property
over things other than themselves). It seems reasonable to suppose, for example,
that individuals have moral rights over their property. However, at the same time, if
individuals do have moral rights over their property, it does not seem to be in virtue
of some claim about the moral significance of self-ownership. Which is to say, it
does not (necessarily) seem to violate an individual’s rights of self-ownership to
seize their property. It might, on Nozick’s line of thinking, be a violation of such a
principle to seize that person, to use them as one would a tool, but not their
property, that is, not the objects they possess. In what sense would that be using
someone as a tool?15 If we accept, though, that people can have moral rights over
their property and that such rights are not derived from individuals’ sovereignty
over themselves, then it also looks like there may be some rights that do not derive
from that moral principle. And if that is the case, then there seems little reason to
think that all rights necessarily act as side-constraints upon action; or, that all rights,
qua rights, are stringent to at least some extent (i.e. the concrete claim).
Of course, any generalist hoping to defend the concrete claim through the
derivative defence need not rely on Nozick’s particular presentation of that
argument (or the presentation of that argument we have ascribed to Nozick).
However, the thought here is that whatever argument the generalist makes at this
point they will face the same three difficulties: first, in establishing the lexical
priority of whatever moral principle they take rights to derive from; second, in
showing that rights are uniquely suited to protecting whatever that moral principle
denotes as of value; and third, in showing that there are no rights worth recognising
as rights that do not derive from that moral principle. It is this last obstacle that, to
my mind, looks especially insurmountable for the generalist, for it seems that we
15 Nozick, it should be noted, attempts to prove the exact opposite. As he puts it:
… patterned principles of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of other persons.
Seizing the results of someone’s labour is equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing him
to carry on various activities. If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded work, for a
certain period of time, they decide what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve
apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you makes them a
part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you. Just as having such partial control and
power of a decision, by right, over an animal or inanimate object would be to have a property right
in it. (Nozick 1974, p. 172)
In this passage, then, Nozick appears to want to claim that violations of one’s property rights necessarily
violate self-ownership, for insofar as some controlling party takes your property they are, in effect,
‘forcing’ you do extra work in service of your goals, and that by taking this decision from you (i.e. the
decision not to do further work in service of your goals), they become a ‘part-owner of you’. However,
there is little in this line of argument that is convincing. In particular, merely putting someone in a
situation where they are ‘forced to work’, even ‘taking decisions from them’, looks a long way from
‘owning’ that person, in part or in whole. Yesterday I parked my car in the last spot available in the
communal parking bay outside my house. In doing so, I ‘forced’ my neighbours to find another spot to
park their car, taking their decision to park in the spot I used ‘from them’. I fail to see any way in which
this makes me a ‘part-owner’ of them.
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might always find at least some rights that do not derive from a single moral
principle. And yet, insofar as we do find such rights, one cannot use the derivative
defence to justify the generalist’s concrete claim.
The Abstract Claim
To review: thus far I have considered three kinds of defences of the generalist’s
concrete claim—ontological defences, superficial defences and derivative defences.
My presentation of these arguments in no way reflects the totality of those arguments
that the generalist may employ. However, the question arises, if the generalist were
willing to give up the concrete claim, might they still hold on to the abstract claim?
Recall, the abstract claim was the claim that however stringent one takes rights to
be, one can say something about the extent of the stringency of any given right simply
by knowing that it is a right. As discussed in section ‘Stringency’, the generalist is free
to make this claim independently of the concrete claim as it has been laid out here.
However, the problem for the generalists at this stage is that if they accept, as we have
assumed they have done, that the ontological defence of the concrete claim is false,
then their abstract claim also appears somewhat redundant. That is, if we accept that
there is at least the possibility that rights may only provide contributory reasons for
action, it also seems clear that there is no reason to think we can say anything about the
extent of a right’s stringency simply by knowing that it is a right. Rather, the mere
identification of a right as a right gives us little information on its stringency one way or
the other: it may present decisive reasons for action, or only contributory reasons.
Against the prescriptions of the generalist’s abstract claim, there is no general rule
about the stringency of rights that follows from their status as rights.
Rejecting Generalism
What, then, if we withdraw our support from the generalist’s claims entirely? What
kind of conception of rights are we left with?
First, it helps to consider what denying the generalist’s abstract and concrete
claims does not commit us to. For example, one thing that denying the traditional
view of rights’ stringency does not commit one to is a ‘weak’ conception of rights,
that is, one which takes rights to be routinely overridden by all other moral
considerations. Of course, insofar as the present conception allows for the
possibility of rights that only act as contributory reasons, it could be viewed as
more friendly to such a conception than the generalist’s.16 However, what is being
16 Although, it is worth noting that even in cases where we find rights that fail to present decisive reasons
for action that is not to say such rights are meaningless, or that we may simply ignore the reasons for
action they present. As noted in section ‘Stringency’, simply by virtue of being a right—which is to say, a
moral consideration of a certain kind—rights necessarily present contributory reasons for action. If, then,
such reasons are to be overridden, they must still be countermanded by contrary reasons of a certain kind.
In Gewirth’s terms, if a moral consideration is to override P’s right, that infringement still needs to be a
justifiable one, otherwise it is simply a violation (Gewirth 1986).
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challenged here is not the notion that rights have such-and-such a level of
stringency, but rather that this is something that can be said of them qua rights.
Returning to the explication of the generalist’s abstract claim in section
‘Stringency’, the non-generalist may agree with the generalist that there is a
general rule about the stringency of rights that holds across all rights. What they
want to deny is the further claim that this is something that follows, in some sense or
other, from the fact that it is a right.
Following on from this point, to recuse oneself from endorsing the generalist’s
abstract and concrete claim does not also necessarily commit one to the idea that
rights are variable in their stringency. That is, it may be (although it is unlikely) that
when we look at each and every right, we find that they all possess a certain level of
stringency, even that they are stringent to precisely the extent that Dworkin, or Raz,
or others, attest. Rather, what the present account asserts is not that rights are
necessarily variable in their stringency, but that a right may still be recognised as a
right even if it fails to present decisive reasons for action with respect to at least
some set of alternative moral considerations.
What emerges from all of this, then, is a more particularist take on rights’
stringency. What the denier of the generalist’s abstract and concrete claims wants to
say—and, indeed, the only thing that they have to say—is that by virtue of the fact
that some rights may only present contributory reasons for action, one cannot know
the stringency of a given right just by virtue of knowing it is a right. For some
readers this might come as something of a shock. However, it is worth stressing that
in endorsing a particularist conception of rights’ stringency we are only bringing
rights back into line with how we think about other kinds of moral consideration.
That is, we are only asserting that the extent to which rights override other kinds of
moral considerations is undetermined simply by virtue of their status as moral
considerations of a particular sort.
As well as coming at little cost, it is also perhaps worth noting that the present
model also has certain advantages. For example, as well as allowing for the
possibility that there are some rights that are just as stringent as, say, Dworkin
suggests, against Dworkin’s position, the present model is also able to acknowledge
the existence of certain rights that fail to meet Dworkin’s ‘trumping’ threshold. That
is, it is able to acknowledge the existence of what, for Dworkin, would be a ‘quasi-
right’. In this sense, then, the present model allows for a broader ecology of rights
than one which we normally think possible, one which includes both those rights
that present decisive reasons for action against rival moral considerations, and those
that merely present contributory reasons for action.
Another benefit of the present model is that it provides argumentative resources
for those who would defend rights against some of their critics. For example, one
criticism that is often levelled at rights-talk is it tends to be overly ‘dogmatic’. As
Glendon (2008, p. 14) puts it, insofar as rights tend toward ‘absoluteness’, they
simultaneously ‘promote unrealistic expectation, heighten social conflict, and
inhibit dialogue that might lead towards a consensus, accommodation, or at least the
discovery of a common ground’. All this, however, is avoided when we recognise
that there may be some rights that only present contributory reasons for action. For
insofar as we do that, it no longer becomes the case that to talk about rights is
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necessarily to talk about ‘absolute’ moral considerations, or reasons for action that
are decisive in all areas in which they occur, but instead to talk about a set of moral
considerations that present us with reasons for action that may be more or less
decisive, or not decisive at all.17
Finally, the present model serves an important epistemic function. That is, in
establishing the possibility that some rights may only present contributory reasons
for action, the present account eschews the thought that we can reach justified
conclusions about what we ought to do, all things considered, simply by looking to
the type of moral considerations at play. Rather, because we know that not all rights
necessarily present decisive reasons for action in all cases in which they occur,
when we are trying to reach judgements about what we ought to do, we need to to
look again at the nature of the right at hand and how it functions with respect to
other kinds of considerations.
Particularism
Before concluding, I want to offer a brief final note about the description of this
account as a ‘particularist’ one. In this article I have labelled the conception of
rights’ stringency I have been developing a particularist account because, in denying
the abstract and concrete claims about rights’ stringency, it denies two generali-
sations that are often held to be true of rights qua rights. In this sense, the stringency
of a right is, on my conception, taken to be more ‘particularist’ than previous, more
‘generalist’ conceptions.
This being said, however, there are certain, even more particularist conceptions
of rights available that some particularists may view as more deserving of the
moniker ‘a particularist conception of rights’ than the conception that I have
outlined here. For example, one generalisation about rights that I have not contested
thus far is the notion that all rights at least present us with contributory reasons for
acting in the way required by the relevant right. Yet there may be some
particularists who want to deny even this general principle. According to this
account, then, there may be some cases in which the presence of a right within a
moral dilemma fails to present us with any reasons to act in the way required by that
right. Indeed, it might even be that they present reasons for us to act in a way utterly
at odds with what that right requires. The fact that my stealing your loaf of bread
violates your property rights, then, might, in some contexts, fail to count as a
consideration against that action, and may even count in its favour.
In one sense, to hold this position would be to endorse a more resolutely
‘particularist’ conception of rights than the one I have put forth here. One thing that
this conception respects, for example, is the particularist dictum that reasons for
action are entirely context-dependent, in the sense that they have the potential to
shift valence from context to context (Dancy 2004). Personally, I find myself fairly
17 An additional line of criticism that might be seen as analogous to Glendon’s—and hence one which
might also be seen as answered by the present model—is the feminist critique that seeks to identify some
of the more peremptory and rigidifying discourses around rights with a confrontational masculine ‘voice’
(Gilligan 1993).
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sympathetic to this position. That is, it seems possible that there may be some cases
in which, say, the fact that an action violates P’s property rights fails to count as a
consideration against that action, and even counts as a consideration in favour of
it.18 However, such positions rest on arguments that are largely outside the scope of
this paper. In the interests of brevity, therefore, I have left the present argument as
leading us simply towards a particularist account of rights’ stringency, rather than a
particularist account of rights.
Conclusion
For all their various disagreements, writers on the metaethics of rights often agree
on two things: that we can say something about the stringency of a given right just
by knowing that it is a right, and that the thing we can know about its stringency is
that it is stringent to at least some extent. In this article, I have contested these
claims. In so doing, I have also attempted to start to move us towards a more
particularist conception of rights’ stringency, which is to say, one which takes the
stringency of any given right as particular to the kind of right it is, rather than
something that follows from its membership as a moral consideration of a particular
sort. Such arguments are not intended to be conclusive. There are far too many
possible justifications of the generalists’ position for one to conclude, on the basis of
the limited range of arguments considered here, that it is entirely without merit. (Far
too little has been said, for example, about Raz’s justification for his view of rights,
and derivative defences other than Nozick’s.) However, at the same time, I hope to
have shown that some of the bases of that position are perhaps less stable than we
might otherwise think, that an alternative conception of rights is viable and, in
certain respects, fairly attractive.
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18 Say, for example, that we imagine that Robin Hood’s project of stealing from the rich to give to the
poor was not only part of an effort to redistribute wealth in his society but also a way of confronting a
certain class in that society—in a way they will find immediately arresting—with the injustice of a society
that had grown overly protective of its property rights (at the cost of all other moral considerations). In
such a situation, we might say that the fact that Robin Hood’s actions violate Prince John’s property rights
do not constitute a reason not to steal his money but rather a reason to steal it. In other words, there would
be even less reason to take the money if it were not his.
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